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ABSTRACT 
This article elucidates the importance of Indo-Pacific in maritime security today. In the 21st century, the 
region has gained the world’s attention due to dramatic growth of China’s economy, steady rise of India, the more 
proactive regional countries, and the increasing oil exports to the region. With such importance, the region has 
been contested with powerful nations, such as China, India, Australia, Japan, the Southeast Asia nations, and even 
the United States. China’s increasing military presence in Indo-Pacific has been perceived as assertive by some of 
the regional countries. Meanwhile, the United States has become a more prominent actor in the region since the 
application of Rebalance policy in 2012. The paper discusses the issues, challenges and prospects of maritime 
security in Indo Pacific. 
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ABSTRAK 
Artikel ini menjelaskan arti penting Indo-Pasifik dalam keamanan maritim dewasa ini. Pada abad ke-21, 
kawasan ini telah mendapat perhatian dunia karena pertumbuhan ekonomi China yang dramatis, bangkitnya 
India, negara-negara regional yang lebih proaktif, dan meningkatnya ekspor minyak ke wilayah ini. Arti penting 
kawasan ini telah diperebutkan dengan negara-negara kuat, seperti China, India, Australia, Jepang, negara-
negara Asia Tenggara, dan bahkan Amerika Serikat. Kehadiran militer China yang meningkat di Indo-Pasifik 
telah dipandang secara serius oleh beberapa negara regional. Sementara itu, Amerika Serikat telah menjadi aktor 
yang lebih menonjol di kawasan ini sejak penerapan kebijakan Rebalance pada tahun 2012. Makalah ini 
membahas masalah, tantangan dan prospek keamanan maritim di Indo Pasifik. 
 
Kata Kunci:  keamanan maritim; kerjasama keamanan maritim; keamanan regional; dinamika keamanan; 
strategi lingkungan
Introduction 
 The Indo-Pacific region stretches from 
the east part of Indian Ocean to the west Pacific 
Ocean and connected by Strait of Malacca. Indo-
Pacific has become the central area for maritime 
geopolitics, security, trade, and environment 
activities.1 The Indo-Pacific region also stands at 
                                                          
1 David Michel and R. Passarelli, Sea Change: 
Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific 
the intersection of international trade, with 
around 32.2 million barrels of crude oil pass 
through annually and 40% of global exports come 
from the region. With such importance, the 
region has been contested with powerful nations, 
such as China, India, Australia, Japan, the 
Southeast Asia nations, and even the United 
States. 
Region (pp. 11-17). Washington DC: Stimson Center. 
2014. 
Power competition between Beijing and 
Washington have been driving the security 
dynamics of Indo-Pacific. Throughout the years, 
China has been increasing the military budget to 
modernize the military technology and its 
capacity on the denial strategy. China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea has caused 
border disputes with the Southeast Asian nations, 
and eventually it draws the attention of the United 
States. Meanwhile, the United States has also 
increased the frequency of regional cooperation 
with Japan, Australia, ROK, New Zealand, India, 
and the Southeast Asian nations under the 
Rebalance policy. Whereas, the United States 
applies deterrence approach to address DPRK’s 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) activities 
and China’s increasing military capability. 2 
 The increased sea-borne activity has also 
raised new maritime security challenges in the 
region. Ensuing maritime disputes in East and 
South China Seas are increasing the security risks 
of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) 
protection. In the Indian Ocean, China and India 
are flexing their naval forces, which have 
increased animosity towards each other. At the 
same time, the Rebalance policy has enabled the 
United States to conduct various maritime 
security operations across the Indo-Pacific. 
Meanwhile other regional countries, such as 
Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Pakistan are also increasing their maritime reach 
to secure the SLOCs and to exploit more 
resources. Not to mention the emergence of non-
traditional threats in the sea, such as piracy, 
maritime terrorism, illegal trafficking, and 
environmental degradation. The many issues of 
maritime security have then shaped the security 
dynamics in Indo-Pacific region. 
 The paper discusses the issues, 
challenges and prospects of maritime security in 
Indo Pacific. The analysis in this paper is divided 
into several sections. The first section elaborated 
the maritime disputes in the region. It then 
followed by the discussions on the role of major 
actors, namely China, the United States, and 
India. It also highlights the issue of non-
traditional threats in the Indo Pacific. This paper 
argues that maritime security is the most 
important aspect in the shaping of security 
architecture in Indo-Pacific. Therefore, many 
nation states are using the maritime security 
cooperation framework in translating their power 
approaches in the region.
                                                          
2 S. Cheney-Peters, US Maritime Security Relations 
and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities 
for Enhanced Operation. In David Michel and R. 
Passarelli (pp. 31-44). 2014. 
Figure 1. Map of Indo-Pacific. 
Maritime Security Cooperation: The 
Framework 
 British maritime thinker, Geoffrey Till, 
describes maritime security concept as good 
order at the sea, where seaborne trade which 
contributes to many states logistic needs have to 
be protected from any kinds of risks and threats.  
However, the concept of good order at the sea 
lacks the discussion by whose standard is it that 
order at sea be considered good. It then continues 
on to the conception of peaceful use of the seas 
regulated by UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). Nation states may refer their 
maritime boundaries to UNCLOS, however 
nation states which seeks maritime supremacy 
will tend to ignore UNCLOS. Strong maritime 
nations then derived their strategic thinking from 
sea power concept by Alfred T. Mahan which 
explained as following: 
“Control of the sea by maritime commerce and 
naval supremacy means predominant influence in 
the world… is the chief among the merely 
material elements in the power and prosperity of 
nations” (Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1918 ) 
 To Christian Bueger, maritime security 
extends beyond traditional dimension.  Maritime 
security connects several issues through existing 
concepts of security, and adapts with emerging 
temporary issues. Bueger still considers the 
concept of seapower, especially the naval forces 
as a tool for achieving national security.  
Seapower in maritime security also discuss how 
nation states operate their navies outside their 
territorial waters. The naval power projection of 
states for warfare means, to secure the SLOCs, 
and to increase the awareness of a states’ 
presence in international waters are the core 
purpose of traditional maritime security. 
Protecting the SLOCs also include search and 
rescue, preventing oil spills in in ocean, 
regulation of maritime installations, and counter 
operations against piracy and terrorism. 
As mentioned before, the aims of 
maritime security is also to protect the SLOCs, 
either for trade shipping lines, gathering natural 
sea resources, and other sea-based activities. 
Thus beyond traditional notion, maritime security 
addresses the strategy in managing maritime 
economy or ‘blue economy’.  Blue economy uses 
maritime security to create a safe maritime 
environment both through laws and regulations, 
and the management of marine resources. The 
management of blue economy links with another 
dimension in maritime security, which is human 
security. The humanity in maritime security 
relates with humanitarian actions /disaster reliefs, 
food security through protecting fishery industry 
from Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, and also protection of marine 
environment. 
 
 
Figure 2. Maritime Security Matrix by Christian Bueger (2015) 
                                   
The writers combined the concept of 
maritime security with security cooperation 
framework to define the concept of maritime 
security cooperation. David Dewitt explained that 
security cooperation attributed the element of 
security should be designed towards 
‘reassurance’ rather than ‘deterrence’ to establish 
a favourable security order where multilateral 
frameworks could be developed3.  In this context, 
security relations would still be relevant in 
facilitating nation states to converge their 
common national interests and minimizing a 
zero-sum security dilemma condition4.  Two or 
more states that have common perception toward 
certain adversaries then might engage in a 
security cooperation framework. This concept 
also recognizes the existing balance of power 
order in determining how the cooperative security 
manners could contribute to the regional or global 
security system5.  In a multipolar order, small to 
middle power states will play a major role in 
creating cooperative security system6.  
To establish such cooperative security, 
nation states must first engage in security 
cooperation activities that will enable them to 
create an inclusive-relations, which eventually 
become the foundation for multilateral security 
frameworks. In terms of maritime security, 
security cooperation serves as bridge that 
connects maritime security understanding of one 
state to the others. The inclusiveness of security 
cooperation would enable nation states to become 
more involved to cooperate in common areas of 
maritime security despite the geopolitical 
restraints. Chris Rahman explained that maritime 
security cooperation has a comprehensive 
approach to address the growing contemporary 
maritime security issues7.  In Indo-Pacific, for 
example, where maritime security issues continue 
to grow due to domestic political differences, 
maritime security cooperation offers a platform 
for regional states to communicate based on their 
commonalities to protect the regional SLOCs.  
However, to establish effective maritime security 
cooperation, it is needed to set up the spectrum of 
maritime security activities which are deemed as 
inclusive.  
                                                          
3 David Dewitt, Common, Comprehensive, and 
Cooperative Security. The Pacific Review 7, 1-15. 
1994. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Gregory J. Dyekman, Security Cooperation: A Key 
to the Challenges of the 21st Century. Washington 
DC: Strategic Studies Institute. 2007. 
6 Michael Moodie, Cooperative Security: Implications 
for National Security and International Relations. 
Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories. 2000. 
7 C. Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security: A 
Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for Good 
Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications 
for New Zealand. Wellington: Victoria University. 
2009. 
Figure 3. Claims over South China Sea. 
Source: National Public Radio, 2016 
Source: National 
Public Radio, 2016 
The Issue of Maritime Disputes 
 There are several maritime areas which 
have been contested the most across the Indo-
Pacific, namely the East China Sea, South China 
Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Although there have 
never been any direct military conflict in those 
areas, however those areas are the sources for 
rising the security risks in the region. The 
contestation of those areas is caused mainly by 
the different security needs of the regional 
countries. Moreover, those areas hold significant 
geostrategic importance, thus the disputes have 
been a complex matter in Indo-Pacific maritime 
security. 
South China Sea 
South China Sea is in the northwest part 
of Southeast Asia, bordered by most of the 
Southeast Asian countries and China. Paracel 
Islands, Spratly Islands, Scaraborough Shoal, 
Natuna Islands, and Macclesfield Bank are 
forming the major islands and reefs in the region. 
South China Sea has a strategic location for 
global shipping trade, with around USD3.37 
trillion trade values passed through in 2016.8 The 
Strait of Malacca serves as the doorway to South 
China Sea and has been dubbed as the second-
busiest oil shipping lines after Strait of Hormuz.9 
The Indo-Pacific countries have been relying on 
the aforementioned economic values of South 
China Sea.  
Holding such strategic importance and 
surrounded by China and the Southeast Asian 
nations, South China Sea is embroiled with 
regional maritime disputes. It is claimed by 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and China as 
seen in Figure 3. The most notable claim is China 
                                                          
8 China Power Team. How Much Trade Transits the 
South China Sea?. China Power. October 2, 2017. 
Accessed December 8, 2017. 
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-
south-china-sea/ 
9 Villar & Hamilton. The Strait of Mlacca, a Key Oil 
Trade Chokepoint, Links the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans. EIA. August 11, 2017. Accesed December 8, 
2017 
with its nine-dash line that covers most of the 
region. China’s unilateral claim has then sparked 
disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia.10 The confusing sea territory claim 
has also caused SLOCs insecurity in South China 
Sea, which put every country at risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32
452. 
10 CFR. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. 
Council on Foreign Relations. Updated December 7,  
2017. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-
tracker#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-
china-sea 
China’s unilateral actions in the region 
have been the main concern in the disputes. China 
is building artificial islands across South China 
Sea to further expand its naval presence, while 
also began exploiting the natural resources 
within.11 Vietnam and Philippines which face 
directly with China’s nine-dash line have then 
increased sea patrols and coast guard activities to 
monitor and, if necessary, respond to any Chinese 
intrusion in their territories. Philippines even 
filed international arbitration case against China 
which the Philippines won in 2016. China has 
rejected the result of the tribunal and continued 
its maritime activities.12 Although there has not 
been any major standoff lately, however the 
territorial maritime dispute still has the potential 
to resurface and disturb the regional stability. 
East China Sea 
The East China Sea is home to the major 
economic powerhouse of Asia, namely China, 
Japan, and ROK. The three countries comprise 
around 23% of total world’s GDP as of 2016.13 
                                                          
11 Since 2013 until now, China has built around 3,200 
acres of land divided into seven islands in South China 
Sea. (CSIS. Island Tracker: China. AMTI CSIS. 
December 13, 2016. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/chinese-occupied-
features/)  
12 Euan Graham. The Hague Tribunal’s South China 
Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning 
Influence? Council on Foreign Relations. August 18, 
2016. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
The East China Sea region continues the shipping 
lines from South China Sea, making the region to 
be strategically important. Natural resources, 
fisheries, and oil and natural gas deposits are also 
reportedly found in the region. The most notable 
maritime dispute in East China Sea is the 
Senkaku/Diayou Islands dispute. The 
Senkaku/Diayou Islands is located in southeast of 
Japan and at the southwestern tip of China. Both 
China and Japan claim the rights over the region 
within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 
nautical miles. Japan has been managing the 
islands since 1895; however, China reclaimed the 
region by citing the historic rights over the area.14 
Senkaku/Diayou Islands is strategically located 
overlooking the South China Sea, which would 
provide SLOCs security for both China and 
Japan. In 2012, Japan officially nationalized the 
islands in which China replied in the following 
year by declaring air defense identification zone 
(ADIZ) covering most of the region.15 Tensions 
peaked between China and Japan, with each 
https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos
/p38227.  
13 Data taken from the World Bank’s GDP Database 
2016. 
14 CFR. Tensions in East China Sea. Council on 
Foreign Relations. Updated December 8, 2017. 
Accessed December 9, 2017. 
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-
tracker#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea 
15 Ibid.  
Source: Oil&Gas Financial Journal, 2015 
Figure 4. The Senkaku/Diayou Islands dispute. 
state’s military flexing at one another in the 
region.
 
Figure 4. Indian Ocean trade route. 
 
Indian Ocean 
 The territory of Indian Ocean stretches 
from the Arabian Sea, south India’s coastal 
waters, until the Bay of Bengal near the entrance 
of Strait of Malacca. As seen in Figure 4, the 
Indian Ocean provides an important international 
shipping route. Oman, Yemen, Somalia, India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and 
Indonesia are the littoral states surrounding the 
Indian Ocean. However Chinese boats is often 
found roaming the area through Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka16, so does the United States navy which 
annually held joint maritime exercise with 
India.17 With the strategic importance and the 
                                                          
16 Jayana Krupakar. China’s Naval Base(s) in the 
Indian Ocean – Signs of a Maritime Grand Strategy? 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 41, Issue 3. pg 207-222. 2017 
17 Malabar Exercise was a bilateral maritime exercise 
between the United States and India which began in 
1992. (Shankar IAS Academy. (2017). Malabar 
Exercise 2017. Chennai: IAS Parliament.)  
countries contesting the region, Indian Ocean’s 
stability is being rattled. 
 At the heart of the Indian Ocean is India, 
which shares maritime border with its seven 
neighbors. According to the India’s maritime 
papers, India has settled maritime boundaries 
with all neighboring countries, except Pakistan.18 
India and Pakistan have long history of border 
disputes, and one of which is the Sir Creek 
maritime dispute.19 However, compared to the 
Kashmir border standoff, Sir Creek dispute is not 
big as a problem. Alas, India and Pakistan 
geopolitical rivalry has the potential to trigger a 
maritime dispute in Indian Ocean. 
18India Ministry of Defence, Ensuring Secure Seas: 
Indian Maritime Security Strategy . New Delhi: India 
Navy. 2015. 
19Sir Creek is a 96 kilometers water strip separating the 
southern part of Pakistan from western India in 
Gujarat. (Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, Confidence 
Building Measures at Sea: Opportunities for India and 
Pakistan. Alberqueque: Sandia National Laboratories. 
2003.) 
Source: Harvard World Map, 2014 
 China’s growing presence is currently the focus 
of discussion in Indian Ocean maritime security. 
India worries over the number of Chinese 
warships and even the nuclear-capable 
submarines roaming in the Indian Ocean. 
Although Chinese officials stated that its naval 
activities are to protect the shipping lines from 
piracy and such threats, however there are 
speculations saying China is asserting maritime 
dominance across Asia.20 India through the Act 
East policy is also increasing maritime control in 
Indian Ocean and even seeking engagement in 
South China Sea.21 As both states are emerging 
global powers with shared border, they see each 
other as regional rivals. 
The Issue of Non-traditional Maritime 
Threats 
 The most common non-traditional 
maritime threat is piracy. Piracy used to be a 
major threat in Strait of Malacca, however 
multilateral engagement has been successful in 
eliminating the danger. Then starting in 2005, 
Somali pirates began roaming the Indian Ocean 
with modern equipment which enable them to 
operate in the range of 1,500 nautical miles from 
Somali coastline. Moreover, the Somali pirates 
are also linked to terrorist organization such as 
Al-Qaeda and Al Shabab. Maritime terrorism 
began to be taken as serious threats after the 26/11 
Mumbai attacks which killed 160 people. 
Maritime terrorist evolve from using the ship 
lines as supply chain to conduct terror attacks 
towards ships and vessels to send political 
message. Philippines-based terror group, Abu 
Sayyaf which pledged allegiance to ISIS, has 
been conducting strikes to cargo ships in Sulu Sea 
and abducting hostages. Although piracy and 
maritime terrorism aim different targets – the 
                                                          
20 David Scott. Chinese Maritime Strategy for the 
Indian Ocean. Center for International Maritime 
Security. November 28, 2017. Accessed December 9, 
2017. http://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-
indian-ocean/34771 
former is economic-driven, while the latter is 
more political – however they have a common 
interest, which is to ensure weak states remain 
corrupt and vulnerable. Human smuggling and 
drug trafficking are also common transnational 
crimes found in Indo-Pacific. Drugs produced in 
Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia is distributed 
by sea to other countries through illegal markets. 
Moreover hundreds of percent profit margins are 
often used to fund other illegal activities such as 
terrorism and piracy. Strong link between the 
transnational crimes, piracy, and terrorism has 
advanced the complexity of non-traditional 
maritime threats in Indo-Pacific. Plus, drug 
trafficking and human smuggling are not dealt 
efficiently due to lack of counter measurement by 
the coast guards or port security facility. 
Seaborne economic activities, such as oil transfer 
and offshore drillings, fishing, and cruise ship 
movements have the potential to damage the 
surrounding marine environment. Major oil spills 
to the sea would affect the sea ecology and 
eventually killed many marine species. Illegal 
fishing that often use explosives and cruise ships 
are prone to endanger the coral reefs that harbor 
marine biodiversity. While the damage is 
threatening to marine ecology, such sea accidents 
may also disturb SLOCs, thus should be 
considered as common maritime threats, 
especially in busy waterway of Indo-Pacific. 
The Challenges of China Maritime Expansion 
in Indo-Pacific 
 China views its security environment in 
Indo-Pacific as generally peaceful. However, 
China addressed the United States’ Rebalance 
and Japan’s security policies as potential 
disturbance to the regional stability.22 In the 
South China Sea issue, the 2017 China’s Asia-
21Amrita Jash, South China Sea in India’s Strategic 
Gambit: Interests and Policies. Brussels: SADF 
Focus. 2016. 
22 Xinhua. Full Text: China’s Military Strategy. Full 
Text: China’s Military Strategy. The Information 
Office of the State Council. May 26, 2015. Accessed 
December 9, 2017. 
Pacific Security Cooperation Policies stated that 
China will cooperate in negotiating the CoC. 
However, China still claims sovereignity over 
South China Sea, though it does not mention any 
reference on the nine-dash line.23 China 
acknowledges that its expanding national interest 
causes its national security to be more vulnerable 
to geopolitical turmoil, thus China needs a strong 
military. China is developing a “two ocean” 
strategy in order to expand its naval operations to 
reach the Indian Ocean.24 This strategy will 
change Chinese Navy capability from only 
conducting far seas operations to actually project 
its naval force to protect far seas maritime assets. 
China is currently expanding its maritime 
dominance beyond the East and South China 
Seas.25 Thus, the maritime strategy has increased 
Chinese naval presence in Indo-Pacific, 
especially in Indian Ocean, in order to take a 
larger role in 2017. 
The most notable Chinese naval strategy 
is the A2/AD which started to be developed in 
1990s. The A2/AD strategy includes 
development to carry out preemptive attacks at 
long ranges to any adversary forces within the 
range of western Pacific Ocean in the air and 
maritime area.26 China’s coastal defense cruise 
missiles, submarines, and naval mines enable the 
PLAN to target any adversary entering the 
Chinese territorial water. Moreover, the PLAN 
South Sea Fleet whose area of responsibility is in 
the South China Sea, has been equipped with 
anti-aircraft destroyers which would cover air 
defense system in the A2/AD. Thus the A2/AD 
strategy will protect China’s territory during 
wartime, and secure the SLOCs for economic 
purposes during peacetime.27
Figure 6. The PLAN routes in Indo-Pacific. 
 
                                                          
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-
05/26/c_134271001_2.htm  
23 Xinhua. Full text: China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific 
Security Cooperation. The Information Office of the 
State Council. January 11, 2017. Accessed December 
10, 2017. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
01/11/c_135973695.htm  
24 The State Council of the People's Republic of China. 
Full text of the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under 
the Belt and Road Initiative. The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China. June 20, 2017. Accessed 
December 9, 2017. 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20
/content_281475691873460.htm 
25 Jayana Krupakar. pg 207-222. 2017 
26 Si-fu Ou, China's A2AD and Its Geographic 
Perspective. Asia Pacific Research Forum, 81-124. 
2014. 
27 Ibid. 
Source: DPG Conference Report, 2016 
From Figure 6, China is seeking to project its 
naval forces through the nine exits across the 
Indo-Pacific. However in its expansion, the 
PLAN’s activities are perceived as assertive by 
the regional countries.  
The following are the list of Chinese maritime 
assertive actions in Indo-Pacific. 
 
 
Table 1. Chinese maritime activities which sparked tensions with the regional countries. 
Maritime 
region 
Chinese actions Time of 
occurrence 
Description 
East China 
Sea 
Implementation of ADIZ Since 2013 ADIZ has enabled Chinese aircraft to intrude 
Japan’s airspace. Since then, Japan has 
intercepted Chinese aircrafts 664 times in 
2016, the most since Cold War.28 
Claims on 
Senkaku/Diayou Islands 
Since 1970s China insists on claiming the Senkaku/Diayou 
Islands in its latest white paper. To assert its 
claim, the PLAN has conducted military drills 
near the territory. 
South China 
Sea29 
Cable-cutting Vietnamese 
oil vessels 
2011-2012 Vietnamese oil vessels explored to Chinese-
claimed sea territory, which then China 
replied by disturbing the activity through 
cutting the cables. 
PLAN accompanying 
fishing boats in 
Scaraborough Shoal 
2012 China’s fishing boats involved in stand-off 
with Philippines coast guard. The following 
days, the PLAN was stationed near the border. 
China-Philippines relations have been tense 
since then.  
Intervention against 
Philippines boats in 
Second Thomas Shoal 
Since 2013 Chinese vessels blocked Philippines supply 
boats that deliver supply to the marines there. 
As of right now,  
Chinese vessels still patrolling the area. 
Chinese oil rig vessels 
and coast guards in 
Paracel Islands 
2014 China deployed oil rig vessels that were 
accompanied by 80 coast guards inside 
Vietnam’s water in Paracel Islands. 
Land reclamation and 
military outposts 
Since 2014 South Sea Fleet of the PLAN has been 
patrolling the area with the help of military 
outposts scattered in the artificial islands 
across the region.  
Indian Ocean PLAN warships and 
submarines in eastern 
Indian Ocean 
Since 2017 Chinese cruise missile destroyers Haikou and 
Changsa were spotted in anti-piracy missions 
and combat drills on February 2017.30 
PLAN military drills in 
western Indian Ocean 
Since 2017 Chinese vessels were also spotted in western 
Indian Ocean conducting combat test to strike 
potential threat, however Chinese officials did 
not define who or what is the threat.31 
                                                          
28 Clay Dillow. Military Nightmare Scenario Brewing in the East China Sea. CNBC. April 4, 2017. Accessed December 8, 
2017. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/04/world-war-iii-nightmare-scenario-brewing-in-the-east-china-sea.html 
29 Richard Q. Turscanyi, Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Power Sources, Domestic Politics, and Reactive 
Foreign Policy. Prague: Springer International Publishing. 2017. 
30 Rajat Pandit. Amid Border Stand-Off, Chinese Ships on Prowl in Indian Ocean. The Times of India. July 4, 2017. Accessed 
December 11, 2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/amid-border-stand-off-chinese-ships-on-prowl-in-indian-
ocean/articleshow/59432702.cms 
31 Teddy Ng and Shi Jiangtao. Chinese Navy’s Live-Fire Drill may be Warning Shot to India Amid Ongoing Doklam Stand-
Off. South China Morning Post. August 26, 2017. Accessed December 11, 2017. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/2108410/chinese-navys-live-fire-drill-may-be-warning-shot-india 
Source: CSIS, AMTI, and individual researches. 
In the Indian Ocean, Chinese maritime 
presence is supported by ports in foreign 
countries. Through the Maritime Silk Road, 
China built a deep-water port in Kyauk Pu, 
Myanmar and in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. 
Recently, China has also opened its first overseas 
military base in Djibouti. However China’s major 
entry point is in Gwadar Port, Pakistan, which is 
part of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC). Starting in 2017, the PLAN will use 
Gwadar Port as naval base for the next 40 years.32 
The ports and military overseas base would boost 
the PLAN’s presence in the Indian Ocean. 
India as Emerging Power in Indo-Pacific 
 Facing directly towards Indian Ocean, 
India has become a prominent actor in Indo-
Pacific. India’s ‘Look East’ policy which was 
introduced in 1990s has expanded India’s 
strategic engagement to the Southeast and East 
Asian countries. Over the years, India’s 
engagement in the region transcended from 
economic relations to security. Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy has 
strengthened India’s approach in Indo-Pacific, in 
which the Act East will increase India’s 
involvement through strategic partnerships. The 
Act East policy also reassures India’s 
commitment to protect the SLOCs of Indian 
Ocean for every littoral state to use. 
 In its 2015 maritime security strategy 
paper, Ensuring Secure Seas, India is focusing on 
naval power to control the SLOCs and 
chokepoints across the Indian Ocean.33 In 
protecting the SLOCs, India seeks cooperation 
with the United States, Japan, Australia, and 
Indonesia which are considered as maritime 
powers. India also seeks to upgrade the naval 
facility in Andaman and Nicobar Islands which 
later become India’s naval outpost to reach 
Southeast Asia and beyond to the Pacific. In the 
western part of Indian Ocean, the Karwar port – 
India’s largest naval base – serves as command 
post to counter and deny any threats from the 
Arabian Sea, with specific threat from Pakistan.34 
Therefore, India is able to protect its territory 
from the west while expanding its reach to the 
east. However, India primary concern is China’s 
maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean. As 
mentioned previously, China’s ports in several 
Indian Ocean states are enabling the PLAN to 
roam freely in Indian Ocean. In the 2015 
maritime security strategy paper, India worries 
over the PLAN activities that potentially disturb 
the freedom of navigation and SLOCs of Indian 
Ocean, based on its assertiveness in South China 
Sea.35 The Act East policy also indicates India’s 
willingness to suppress China’s maritime 
influence in the region. India has also started to 
engage the South China Sea imbroglio by 
providing naval equipment to Vietnam and 
multilateral military platforms such as the 
MILAN Exercise.36
 
                                                          
32 David Scott. Chinese Maritime Strategy for the 
Indian Ocean. Center for International Maritime 
Security. November 28, 2017. Accessed December 9, 
2017. http://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-
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33 India Ministry of Defence, Ensuring Secure Seas: 
Indian Maritime Security Strategy (pp. 9-10). New 
Delhi: Indian Navy. 2015. 
34 Balaji Chandramohan, India’s Evolving Maritime 
Security Strategy and Force Posture. Perth: Future 
Directions International. 2016. 
35 Satu Limaye, Weighted West, Focused on the Indian 
Ocean and Cooperating across the Indo-Pacific: The 
Indian Navy's New Maritime Strategy, Capabilities, 
and Diplomacy Arlington: CNA Analysis and 
Solutions. 2017. 
36Ramanand Garge, Maritime Outreach as Part of 
India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. Australian Journal of 
Maritime & Ocean Affairs 9, Issue 3, 150-167. 2017.. 
The role of a strong navy as stated in 
2015 maritime security strategy paper is 
efficiently adapted to the Act East policy as a 
strategic diplomatic tool. Since 2015 the bilateral 
Malabar Exercise between the United States and 
India has become a trilateral form which includes 
Japan as permanent member.37 Welcoming the 
framework of “free and open” Indo-Pacific, India 
has also enhanced the maritime partnership with 
Japan. Prior to ASEAN and East Asia summits in 
November 2017, India with the United States, 
Australia, and Japan held a discussion that 
indicates forming of a quadrilateral security 
relation in Indo-Pacific, which subsequently to 
contain China’s maritime assertiveness in South 
China Sea.38 
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38 Harsh V. Pant. Take Note: Asia’s Quad is Back. The 
Diplomat. November 10, 2017. Accessed December 
13, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/take-note-
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The Future Role of the United States in Indo-
Pacific 
 The United States foreign and defense 
policy in Indo-Pacific have evolved over the 
years. Through the United States Pacific 
Command (PACOM) stationed in Hawaii and 
military bases in Australia, Japan, ROK, Guam, 
and Diego Garcia in Indian Ocean, the United 
States has maintained its presence in the region.39 
The United States alliance agreement with Japan, 
Australia, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines remain as the foundation of strategic 
actions in Indo-Pacific. Engagement with India as 
the emerging power has also strengthened the 
United States’ presence, especially in observing 
the Indian Ocean.40 The holistic regional 
approach is deemed requisite in preserving the 
American dominance in Indo-Pacific. 
 Previously known as “the pivot to Asia,” 
the Rebalance policy has aimed to shift the 
United States’ focus to the region. Through the 
39 USPACOM, United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) Guidance. Washington DC: Department 
of Defense. 2016. 
40 Vivek Mishra, US Power and Influence in the Asia-
Pacific Region: The Decline of ‘Alliance Mutuality’. 
Strategic Analysis 40, Issue 3, 159-172. 2016. 
Source: CSIS, 2016. 
Figure 7. The United States military troops in Indo-Pacific. 
Rebalance policy, the United States plan to post 
60% of the naval and overseas air assets in the 
Pacific region by 2020.41 China is undoubtedly 
the biggest factor in Rebalance policy. China’s 
expansion presents the primary strategic 
challenge to the United States’ security in Indo-
Pacific. Chinese assertive maritime behavior – in 
East and South China Seas – has resulted in the 
United States to prepare a strategy to counter 
Chinese military actions, especially against 
China’s A2/AD strategy.42 
 The Rebalance policy also realizes the 
growing geostrategic importance of the region, 
and has increased the approach to security and 
diplomatic relations with regional countries. The 
United States continued to engage through joint 
naval operations and exercises with Japan, ROK, 
Australia, Philippines, and India. The United 
States has also committed USD140 million in 
2016 for maritime capacity building assistance to 
increase the regional countries capability in 
securing the SLOCs and resolving maritime 
disputes.43 As tensions rise in Indo-Pacific 
maritime security, the United States remain 
engaged with the multilateral mechanism such as 
the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus 
(ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
the Shangri-La Dialogue, and conducted the 
largest naval exercise in the world, the Rim of the 
Pacific (RIMPAC) which include China. 
However, the election of President Donald 
Trump in 2017 has been speculated to bring a 
different Indo-Pacific approach. The United 
States’ commitment in the region was questioned 
when President Trump decided to withdrew from 
the TPP.44 However beyond the trade policy, the 
United States’ security policy in Indo-Pacific 
                                                          
41The United States Department of Defense, The Asia-
Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. 
National Security Objectives in a Changing 
Environment. Washington DC: Department of 
Defense. 2015. 
42 Ibid. pg. 10-19. 
43 Kathleen Hicks, Mark F. Cancian, and Michael 
Green. (pp. 70). 2016. 
44 Prashanth Parameswaran. What Trump’s TPP 
Withdrawal Means for US Asia Policy. The Diplomat. 
January 24, 2017. Accessed December 13, 2017. 
remains strong. Under President Trump’s 
administration, the United States redefine the 
region as ‘Indo-Pacific’ to indicate an idea of 
“India to the west, and America to the East.”45 By 
addressing the region as Indo-Pacific and forging 
enhanced security cooperation with India, 
President Trump continues the Rebalance aim of 
containing China’s expanding influence. 
 Through its latest 2017 National Security 
Strategy, the United States called for a “free and 
open Indo-Pacific,” a term previously used by 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to unveil Japan’s 
maritime strategy.46 The free and open Indo-
Pacific called for the creation of regional 
democracy platform that will protect the maritime 
commons from the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
Prime Minister Abe has been the vocal figure in 
involving Australia, India, and the United States 
to form quadrilateral security relations. The 
National Security Strategy 2017 has also stated to 
increase the quadrilateral relations with Australia, 
Japan, and India; additionally the United States 
will expand security cooperation with India.47 
With the four countries entering quadrilateral 
dialogue, President Trump’s administration may 
be able to shift the geopolitical construct of Indo-
Pacific. 
Conclusion 
 As Indo-Pacific becomes the center of 
global economic activities, geopolitics, and 
security dynamics, the region needs a 
comprehensive maritime security cooperation. 
The regional maritime security cooperation is 
needed to preserve the increasing seaborne 
activity and to maintain SLOCs stability. China’s 
expanding maritime influence, emergence of 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/what-trumps-tpp-
withdrawal-means-for-us-asia-policy 
45 C. Raja Mohan, Donald Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ and 
America’s India Conundrum. ISAS Insights, No. 476. 
2017. 
46 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Priority Policy 
for Development Cooperation FY 2017. Tokyo: 
International Cooperation Bureau. 2017. 
47 SEAL of the President of the United States, National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington DC: The White House. 2017.   
India as regional power, the United States Indo-
Pacific approach, and the regional non-traditional 
maritime issues have become the core discussions 
in Indo-Pacific maritime security. East and South 
China Seas disputes have raised the risks in the 
region. Indian Ocean SLOCs stability also needs 
to be managed, as the waterway has become the 
busiest sea lines in the world. A “free and open” 
Indo-Pacific implied by the quadrilateral 
Australia, India, Japan, and the United States 
should be treated carefully. The quad countries 
seem to agree on common strategic problem in 
Indo-Pacific, which is China’s maritime 
expansion. China on the other hand, has become 
an important partner for the region in terms of 
maritime trade and investment; however its naval 
presence is still not quite welcomed by some 
regional countries. Working closely with the 
Chinese military while maintaining the 
international maritime order, is important to 
avoid direct armed conflicts. Conducting capacity 
building such as joint training, ports visit, 
information exchange, etc. is will build trust and 
collective maritime security. The power 
competition between the above major powers will 
then shape the future pattern of interactions in 
Indo-Pacific. 
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